The removal of Nicolás Maduro from power represents far more than a regional operation—it marks a pivotal recalibration of American power projection in an era of intensifying great power competition with China. For the United States, Venezuela wasn't simply about regime change; it was about reasserting hemispheric dominance and denying Beijing its most valuable strategic foothold in America's backyard.
Venezuela's importance to U.S. strategy operates on multiple levels. First, the country possesses the world's largest proven oil reserves, an asset that China had been steadily incorporating into its energy security portfolio through over $10 billion in loans and infrastructure investments. By removing Maduro, Washington has effectively cut off Beijing's access to a critical energy supplier just 1,500 miles from American shores—a feat of strategic denial that reverberates across the global chessboard.
Second, the operation demonstrated American resolve in ways that speeches and policy papers never could. For years, Beijing had been testing whether the United States still possessed the will to enforce its traditional sphere of influence. The answer delivered through special operations forces in Caracas was unambiguous: the Monroe Doctrine isn't a historical relic but a living strategic framework.
Third, and perhaps most significantly, Venezuela's transformation into a Chinese client state represented an existential threat to the Trump administration's vision of hemispheric consolidation. With Chinese-built ports, 5G infrastructure, and mining operations spreading across Latin America, the United States faced the prospect of strategic encirclement in its own neighborhood. The Maduro operation reversed this trajectory in a single stroke.
The Taiwan-Greenland-Venezuela Triangle
The Trump administration's simultaneous focus on three seemingly disparate territories—Venezuela, Greenland, and Taiwan—reveals a coherent grand strategy aimed at securing American dominance across three critical domains: energy, Arctic resources, and semiconductor supply chains.
Greenland has emerged as a strategic obsession not merely for its symbolic value but for its concrete military and economic importance. The island offers the United States control over Arctic shipping lanes that are becoming increasingly navigable due to climate change, rare earth minerals essential for advanced technologies, and forward military positions that would allow American forces to monitor and potentially interdict Chinese and Russian activities in the far north. Control of Greenland would give Washington dominance over the Arctic in the same way that Venezuela provides energy security in the south.
Meanwhile, represents the crown jewel of the global technology supply chain, producing over 90% of the world's most advanced semiconductors. For the United States, Taiwan isn't just an ideological commitment to democracy—it's an economic and military imperative. Loss of Taiwan would hand China control over the technologies that power everything from smartphones to weapons systems, fundamentally shifting the balance of global power.
The strategic logic connecting these three territories is straightforward: if the United States can consolidate control over the Western Hemisphere (Venezuela) and the Arctic (Greenland) while denying China expansion beyond its immediate periphery, Washington can hope to negotiate from a position of overwhelming strength on the Taiwan question.
New Global Equilibrium: The Grand Bargain Scenario
Imagine a future negotiated settlement—perhaps emerging from the April summit between Trump and Xi Jinping—that establishes clear spheres of influence: China gains Taiwan, while the United States consolidates control over Greenland and Venezuela. What would this new equilibrium look like?
The Western Hemisphere Under American Dominion
With Venezuela firmly in the American orbit and Greenland integrated into U.S. strategic planning (whether through purchase, enhanced defense agreements, or de facto control), the United States would achieve total energy independence and Arctic supremacy. American companies would dominate Venezuelan oil extraction, generating hundreds of billions in revenue while denying China access to critical energy supplies.
The Western Hemisphere would function as a unified economic bloc under American security guarantees, with Chinese infrastructure projects either dismantled or repurposed. Mexico, Central America, and South America would align with Washington through a combination of economic incentives and security partnerships, creating a fortress America that stretches from the Arctic to Tierra del Fuego.
China's Taiwan Integration
In this scenario, China would absorb Taiwan through a negotiated reunification—possibly after a limited military operation that the United States declines to resist militarily, instead imposing economic measures that Beijing has already priced into its calculations. China would gain control of Taiwan's semiconductor fabs, though the most advanced equipment and talent might flee to the United States, Japan, and South Korea during the transition period.
Beijing would achieve its paramount "core interest," solidifying Communist Party legitimacy domestically while establishing unambiguous control over the First Island Chain. The East and South China Seas would become Chinese lakes, with American naval access restricted or negotiated. China's Belt and Road Initiative would refocus entirely on Eurasia, Africa, and Oceania, abandoning Latin America as the price of its Taiwan victory.
Implications for Europe: Strategic Autonomy or Atlantic Dependence?
For Europe, this new equilibrium would present an existential dilemma. With China controlling Taiwan and its semiconductor production, Europe would face a stark choice: accept technological dependence on Beijing or accelerate its own semiconductor independence through massive subsidies—a project that would cost hundreds of billions of euros and take a decade or more.
Simultaneously, European energy security would become even more dependent on American goodwill, as Washington's control of Venezuelan oil and potential Arctic resources would give the United States leverage over global energy markets that could rival OPEC. Germany, France, and other major European economies would find themselves squeezed between an ascendant China in the East and a newly assertive America in the West.
The European Union's long-sought "strategic autonomy" would become either a urgent necessity or an impossible dream. Without independent access to advanced semiconductors or energy security, Europe might fracture, with some nations gravitating toward the American sphere for security and others attempting accommodation with China for economic access. NATO would face a crisis of purpose: designed to counter Russia, the alliance would struggle to define its role in a world where the primary competition occurs between Washington and Beijing, with Europe as a spectator.
India: The Unexpected Beneficiary
India emerges as perhaps the biggest winner in this scenario. With China preoccupied with Taiwan integration and facing American containment in the hemisphere and Arctic, New Delhi would have unprecedented freedom to assert itself in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region.
The United States would likely court India even more aggressively as a counterweight to Chinese power in Asia, offering technology transfers, defense partnerships, and market access that would accelerate India's rise. China's absorption of Taiwan might actually strengthen India's hand, as American strategists would view New Delhi as the indispensable partner for maintaining any balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.
India could also position itself as the "swing state" in this new global order, maintaining relations with both Washington and Beijing while pursuing its own interests. With China locked in consolidation mode in East Asia and the United States focused on the Americas and Arctic, India would have maximum leverage to negotiate favorable terms with both powers.
Moreover, if China's Taiwan operation disrupts semiconductor supplies, India's growing tech sector could attract investment as companies seek alternatives to Chinese-controlled production. The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, already in planning stages, could become the primary alternative to Chinese Belt and Road infrastructure.
The Arab World: Energy Politics Transformed
For oil-producing Arab nations, particularly Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iraq, American control of Venezuelan oil presents both threat and opportunity. On one hand, Venezuela's vast reserves returning to global markets under American management could depress oil prices, reducing petrostate revenues. The United States would possess unprecedented leverage over global energy markets.
On the other hand, Chinese control of Taiwan and focus on Eurasian consolidation might actually increase Arab leverage with Beijing. China would become more dependent on Middle Eastern energy supplies, unable to diversify through Venezuelan oil. This could lead to deeper Chinese investment in Arab economies, infrastructure, and technology sectors.
The Abraham Accords countries—UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and potentially Saudi Arabia—would likely deepen their American alignment, seeing the United States as the dominant global power capable of projecting force and reshaping regions. However, countries like Iraq and Syria, with closer ties to Iran and Russia, might tilt toward accommodation with China.
The Palestinian question would become even more marginalized in global politics, as American attention focuses on great power competition rather than Middle Eastern peace processes. Arab states would need to navigate carefully between American security guarantees and Chinese economic opportunities, with the possibility that some nations might split these functions—American military protection, Chinese infrastructure investment.
Russia: The Forgotten Player
In this new equilibrium, Russia becomes the most diminished power. With China focused on Taiwan and the United States dominant in the Western Hemisphere, Moscow would find itself without viable partners. Its betrayal of China during the Venezuela operation—evacuating diplomats without informing Beijing—would poison Sino-Russian relations.
Russia would likely become increasingly dependent on China economically while resenting Chinese dominance politically. The Arctic competition over Greenland would leave Russia isolated in the far north, unable to match American resources. Moscow might attempt to play spoiler, but without the capacity to fundamentally alter the new global balance.
The Fragility of Grand Bargains
This scenario, while internally coherent, rests on numerous fragile assumptions. Would China really accept international recognition of its Taiwan control in exchange for hemispheric retreat? Would the American public support what critics would call "abandoning" Taiwan? Would Europe accept its diminished status without attempting to build alternative power centers?
More fundamentally, the scenario assumes both powers can maintain control over their respective spheres without internal challenges. American consolidation of Latin America would face resistance from countries with independent traditions. Chinese integration of Taiwan could trigger protracted insurgency or economic disruption that undermines Beijing's victory.
The scenario also assumes other powers—India, Europe, Japan, South Korea—would accept this bipolar division rather than forming their own coalitions to preserve autonomy. In reality, the world might fragment into multiple competing blocs rather than consolidating into two clear spheres.
The Stakes of the Current Moment
Whether or not this precise equilibrium emerges, the Maduro operation has fundamentally altered the strategic landscape. The United States has demonstrated that it remains willing to use hard power to enforce its hemispheric interests. China must now recalculate whether its Latin American ambitions are worth the cost of American resistance.
The April summit between Xi and Trump will reveal whether these two powers can negotiate a stable division of the world—or whether they are destined for escalating competition across every domain. For American strategists, Venezuela was never just about oil or ideology; it was about drawing a line that establishes where American power begins and Chinese influence must end.
The question now is whether Beijing accepts that line in the Caribbean in exchange for a freer hand in the Taiwan Strait—and whether Washington is truly willing to make such a trade. The answer will shape the global order for decades to come, determining not just the fate of Venezuela, Taiwan, and Greenland, but the future balance of power that will govern the 21st century.
